A valid peace proposal
THERE IS an old adage that war is too important to be left to the generals. The launch Monday of a virtual peace treaty between unofficial Israeli and Palestinian negotiators -- a detailed parceling out of land and sovereignty called the Geneva Accord -- suggests that peacemaking is too important to be left to Yasser Arafat and Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.
Reacting to the news that Secretary of State Colin Powell will meet the two principal authors of the accord -- Yossi Beilin, a former minister of justice in Israel, and Yasser Abed Rabbo, formerly the Palestinian information minister -- the Sharon government took the unusual step of publicly criticizing Powell.
Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who frequently defends Sharon's policies in public, said to Israel Radio: "This is an incorrect step by a senior representative of the American administration. I am certain of his friendship, but I would cast doubt on his judgment in this matter."
When Powell receives Beilin and Rabbo tomorrow in Washington, the judgments in question will be Sharon's and Arafat's. There is, of course, no equivalence or even resemblance between the two old warhorses, but neither one has been able to bring his people the peace that both communities desperately need. Each leader appears to prefer continuing the conflict rather than making the compromises that are required for the sake of a durable and just two-state solution.
The Geneva Accord delineates those compromises. This is its great virtue.
Recently, every Israeli with a mailing address was sent a copy of the agreement. Those who read it will find that some of the most cherished, historic goals of the Israeli mainstream are achieved in this model peace accord. The text commits the Palestinians to ending their conflict with Israel. Article One of the document states: "The implementation of this agreement will settle all the claims of the parties arising from events occurring prior to its signature."
If a real peace accord including this crucial premise were to be signed someday, it would enshrine Palestinian acceptance of a defined territory for their state. Each side would cede the claim of its ultras to all the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. No Palestinian refugees could return to lost homes in Israel without Israel's consent. Most Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza would come under Palestinian sovereignty, but some 200,000 settlers in two big settlements would be absorbed into Israel. And the Palestinians would accept Israel's self-definition as the state of the Jewish people.
If Powell shows good judgment, he will tell Beilin and Rabbo not simply that they conducted an interesting exercise but that they negotiated a good agreement -- one not too different from the treaty that future leaders will have to sign one day.