ADAM
B. KUSHNER
On
the precipice of civil conflict
In
his victory lap around the Middle East last week, President Bush must
have confronted an astonishing reality: By ending one war in that region,
he intensified three others. Now, in addition to the low-grade Israeli-Palestinian
war, both the Palestinians and the Israelis are on the precipice of
their own civil wars. They may not be violent, but the stakes in these
ugly internecine battles are high: the hearts and minds of constituents
who can reject the peace process if they see it as unfair.
The
mutual trust that Bush tried to broker at Aqaba last week cannot be
borne out until these internal conflicts have been fought and won by
the moderates on each side.
The
most immediate aftereffect of the summit is the Palestinian civil war.
As
part of the road map for peace that Bush is pressing in the Middle East,
Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas is expected to discontinue
terrorism on Israelis. Attempting to do so will pit the secularists
in the Palestinian Authority against the jihadists of Hamas, which maintains
popular support through its extensive social-services network. Both
groups yearn for a Palestinian state, but the jihadists see the very
existence of Israel as an impediment. So Abbas must either undertake
a clampdown, which would make him unpopular with Palestinian security
forces that are in disarray, or persuade Hamas to end the violence.
OPENING SALVOS
Abbas'
return from Aqaba was greeted with the opening salvos of the Palestinian
civil war. Hamas pulled out of cease-fire discussions and criticized
Abbas' statement that ''we do not ignore the suffering of Jews throughout
history.'' Even Yasser Arafat, the humiliated PA chairman, took a swipe
at Abbas, saying that Abbas had given away too much without winning
substantial concessions in return. Then, on Sunday, the three main terrorist
groups took the unusual step of coordinating an attack.
If
Hamas provokes Abbas to disarm the group by force, it will set off a
bloody conflict that will further erode his peace mandate. And if his
standing continues to sink, he won't have the authority to curb suicide
bombings or negotiate with Israelis. Stalemate.
The
future of the road map depends on Abbas' convincing the Palestinians
that compromise is better than war. Israeli carrots (freer borders and
freed detainees) and sticks (closures, searches and arrests) can help.
Yet
the prospect, however unlikely, of Abbas' emerging victorious from a
Palestinian civil war -- with a mandate to bargain with Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon -- has spurred a revolt among Israel's far-right
governing coalition. Its members are suddenly alarmed that Sharon, like
his predecessors, might be willing to trade away land for peace. Their
umbrage will power the Israeli civil war.
Settlement
building in the West Bank began after the Six Day War in 1967 as a security
measure. The idea was to buffer Israel's western front from an Arab
attack out of Jordan or Iraq. But as settlers multiplied -- particularly
after the Oslo Accords -- they needed their own protection by the Israeli
army. The frontier gradually crept eastward.
For
Israel's ultra-Orthodox Jews, the policy took on a messianic fervor.
They believed that they were reclaiming the land promised to them in
the Hebrew Bible. Their vision synced conveniently with the buffer strategy
until just recently. These days, neither Jordan nor Iraq poses a threat
to Israel; Jordan made its peace in 1994, and Iraq's anti-Israel regime
ceased to exist in April. To top it off, the second intifada made abundantly
clear that Israel will never achieve a lasting peace with satellite
towns dotting the West Bank.
Today
the pragmatist agenda has changed -- security depends on removing settlements,
not building them -- but the messianic one has not. The religious Zionists
will confront Sharon and the secularists as they pursue peace with Abbas.
At a party conference last weekend, many Likudniks demanded that Sharon
sign his name to a policy paper ''retaining and strengthening settlement
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip'' and ''retaining Israeli control of
security zones and the Jordan Valley.'' He declined, perhaps hastening
the civil conflict.
The
more-conspicuous, low-grade war, which consumes our attention, is the
war between the two peoples. But that war cannot be resolved
until the wars among the peoples end.
The
Israeli contest will concern the nature of a Jewish democracy, and like
the Palestinian one, it will pit secularists against religious fundamentalists.
Both leaders are exchanging domestic support for international credibility
(and mutual trust), which means that they are treading on infirm political
ground.
Adam B. Kushner is a reporting and writing fellow in residence at the
Poynter Institute for Media Studies.
©
2003 The Miami Herald and wire service sources.