Map or minefield?

Map or minefield? / Don't ambush a Middle East peace plan

Saturday, May 10, 2003

Nobody ever thought it would be easy, but already the essential parties to implementation of the "road map" to a two-state resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by 2005 are trying to lay down land mines in the road to a sustainable peace.

On the Palestinian side, Chairman Yasser Arafat, in principle supplanted as lead Palestinian negotiator by new Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, is still maneuvering within the Palestinian political structure to hold on to as much power as possible.

In particular, Mr. Arafat is trying to keep Mr. Abbas' appointee, Muhammad Dahlan, from actually assuming control of the Palestinian security structure, presumably because Mr. Arafat is afraid that Mr. Dahlan will take the opportunity to bring out into the open some of the chairman's more corrupt and duplicitous dealings over the years.

The Syrians have weighed in, predictably, in opposition to the fact that the road map does not address their main issue -- the fate of the Golan Heights, seized by the Israelis from Syria in 1967. Syria is probably not able to stall the negotiating process, but it has always been hard to ignore. Although the Syrians' military capacity is modest, they are still parked in Lebanon where they harbor Hezbollah, which continues to harass Israel periodically.

Israel itself, particularly in the person of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, has so far taken a rather obdurate and uncooperative approach to the road map initiative. The road map itself has a broad, positive provenance, having been agreed upon by all of the major external parties to an agreement, the United States, the United Nations, the European Union and Russia -- working together as the so-called Quartet.

Israel should, in principle, be pleased at recent developments in the region. In particular, its best-armed declared enemy, Iraq, has been put out of business. Even more important, the clear ability of the United States, Israel's prime protector, demonstrated to the region and to the world in the Iraq war its ability to intervene decisively and quickly in the area to work its will.

The sort of long-term guarantee that capacity constitutes for Israel is inestimable in its value, and should serve as a basis for Israeli willingness to work constructively to implement the road map, sure of its security.

Instead, Mr. Sharon is playing games. Secretary of State Colin Powell will be traveling to the area shortly; Mr. Sharon indicates that he really wants to talk only with President Bush about the road map, undercutting Mr. Powell in advance in his ability to carry out what may be the most important work of diplomacy the secretary of state will undertake during his term.

The real sticking point is likely to be Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, a subject on which Israel will have to give ground, not only to respect the terms of the road map but also to extract corresponding concessions from the Palestinian side. A comparably difficult Palestinian potential sticking point is the "right of return" -- the ability of Palestinian refugees driven out of Israel in 1948 to return there in an accord.

Mr. Powell will tackle all aspects of the road map project in a few days. This won't be easy, but given the stakes in terms of long-term American relations in the Middle East, not to mention relations between the West and the Muslim world, he will have to be prepared to play hardball. That might include using the leverage of the billions in aid the United States provides Israel.

Mr. Bush will have to provide Mr. Powell full support in the negotiating effort and not let Mr. Sharon or anyone else slip around him and succeed in avoiding what can be an excellent resolution to a very old and dangerous problem.