Engage Mr. Sharon

Saturday, December 20, 2003

THE ANNOUNCEMENT by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of a unilateral "disengagement plan" for the West Bank and Gaza Strip sounded momentous. If no progress is made in peace talks with the Palestinians in the coming months, Mr. Sharon said, Israel might create its own de facto border by completing the construction of a security fence, redeploying troops and dismantling outlying Jewish settlements. The speech, however, left plenty of room for maneuver. Mr. Sharon didn't say where the unilateral boundary would be drawn, which or how many settlements would be evacuated or even when any action would begin. He suggested negotiations with the Palestinian Authority and promised to implement a series of measures required of Israel by the Bush administration's incremental "road map" plan. In effect, the address gave the impression of great movement while committing Mr. Sharon to nothing concrete.

The veteran Israeli leader has not changed: He still hopes to preserve Israeli control indefinitely over most of the West Bank. What produced his initiative was not fresh inspiration but a sudden shift of the political climate in Israel. After years of grimly supporting Mr. Sharon's hard-line stance, Israelis have been galvanized by a series of independent proposals for a two-state solution. They also have begun to listen to warnings from senior military figures that some concessions must be made on the ground and to demographers who predict that without them, Israel will soon rule over a land in which Jews are a minority. A senior figure in Mr. Sharon's own Likud party recently proposed a unilateral withdrawal to a border that would ensure that Israel could remain a democratic Jewish state. Meanwhile, Mr. Sharon's popularity has been sinking. He has been pressured by the Bush administration to start taking some of the steps in the road map and by Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia to negotiate a cease-fire. His response has been to give all sides the impression he may act as they propose.

Such misdirection may explain the confused response of the Bush administration. One White House spokesman warned against unilateral action by Israel, while another official, on background, praised the promises aimed at Washington. In fact, the changing climate in Israel -- and the several months that have passed without major acts of Palestinian terrorism -- may give President Bush his first opportunity since the summer to make progress. To do so, he must insist that Mr. Sharon not attempt to unilaterally impose his idea of a territorial division, which would probably limit Palestinian rule to Gaza and pockets of the West Bank surrounded on all sides by fences or Israeli troops. If Israel is to create a de facto border, it must be one that makes possible a viable Palestinian state -- which means a single line close to Israel's current boundaries.

But Mr. Bush can also press Mr. Sharon to implement the specific short-term measures he promised: to take down scores of Jewish outposts established in the past several years, to prevent settlement expansions outside existing lines and to lift curfews and roadblocks in Palestinian areas. With sufficient impetus from the White House, Mr. Sharon just might be induced to take the most exceptional action his speech suggested: a stand against the Jewish settlement movement that he has done so much to create and foster. Reining in Israel's settlers wouldn't, by itself, bring about a peace settlement -- but it would be a major step forward.