By Barry Rubin
November 14, 2004

WITHIN HOURS of Yasser Arafat's death, the new era of Palestinian politics is already dawning: an extended transition period with lots of in-fighting and paralysis.

The hopeful aspect is that moderates might gain control for the first time ever. But while Arafat's departure removes the main roadblock, they will still have a hard time being able to negotiate peace with Israel.

For 35 years, Arafat dominated every aspect of the movement. Now his power has been dispersed. There are 10 different groups, a dozen security agencies, and innumerable factions. Most are hard line, and their goal remains Israel's destruction. All prefer to act independently. Arafat left behind him a movement whose political culture is based on a lack of discipline.

Arafat's own posts have been split four ways, signaling the deep divisions and coming moderate-hardline battle:

The head of the PLO, the umbrella group claiming to represent all Palestinians, is Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazin), 69. He is a veteran revolutionary and ideologue who has also become pragmatic. Abbas became a tough critic of Arafat, declaring the intifada had failed and a negotiated solution was needed. But despite being the great moderate hope, he lacks both strong support and charisma, elements needed to gain real control of the movement and persuade it to accept a compromise peace.

The prime minister will continue to be Ahmad Qurei, 67, another genuine but weak moderate.

The interim head of the Palestinian Authority is Rawhi Fattouh, 55, a minor figure who briefly served as chair of the Palestinian legislature. He is supposed to be replaced by elections in two months but these may never be held. This could leave Fattouh as the man who actually runs things in the West Bank and Gaza Strip but is incapable of doing so.

The real man to watch is Faruq Qaddumi, 73, Fatah's new leader. This is arguably the most important job of all. Qaddumi is a hardliner who opposed the peace process, refuses to recognize Israel, and will fight hard against any negotiated peace. He is also close to Syria and might be a conduit for radical states to gain influence over the movement.

While Qaddumi's power may be diluted if he stays in Tunis, Fatah is going to be the force restraining Abbas from accomplishing much. Without its approval -- and hardliners overwhelmingly rule the group, no Palestinian negotiator will be able to offer, make, or implement a deal with Israel.

The likely dynamic will be that Abbas will try to end the violence and hold serious negotiations while Qaddumi, backed by dozens of top Fatah chiefs, young grassroots' radicals, and Islamist groups, will stop him.

The new leadership faces two immediate tests and these conflicts may make them fail both. First, if the roadmap plan or any peace process is to advance it must end the terrorist violence against Israel. But how can this happen?

If Abu Mazin asks Hamas and his own Fatah gunmen to stop attacks, they will laugh. If he cuts off their funds and guns, they might try to kill him. Will the fragmented and bickering security services follow his orders and shoot at fellow Palestinians to stop terrorist attacks on Israel? Will Qaddumi and Fatah itself let him give such an order? The answer, unfortunately, is probably not. Already, radicals are threatening anyone who wants to stop the fighting.

The other challenge is Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. The leadership must build an administration able to govern the area. This is the best way to build domestic and international credibility, to show that Palestinians are ready for a state and peace.

Again, though, this will be tough to achieve. Aside from moderate-radical and nationalist-Islamist splits, ambition and greed will make local warlords and officials reluctant to cooperate. And there may be no single authority for them to cooperate with.

Obviously, if moderates are going to take control of the Palestinians they will need help. But neither Israel nor the United States can do much. Appearing to support anyone would merely assure that person is called a traitor.

Arafat has now left the Palestinians to work out new arrangements by themselves. After so many failures by Arafat, the movement is getting still one more second chance. The world can only hope it is used wisely.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs Center and co-author of "Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography."

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