In Mideast, Bush gets a rare third chance
WASHINGTON -- PRESIDENT BUSH is getting a rare chance to get something right that he messed up twice before -- America's response to the dangerous inability of Palestinians and Israelis to resolve differences.In his first term, Bush confused his disgust with Yasser Arafat with a policy. In effect, he allowed his disgust to become the US policy.
It was a poor substitute. Now, with Arafat gone and with a huge push from an ally to whom he is deeply indebted -- Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair -- Bush has decided to make up for his past.
The danger is that what seem like intractable obstacles to a final settlement will be permitted to block the incremental progress that is necessary to set the stage for an eventual deal. As the president himself framed it last week, it is a perfectly reasonable and achievable goal to have a stable Palestinian nation occupying contiguous territory in Gaza and on nearly all of the West Bank with East Jerusalem as its capital before Bush leaves office in 2009.
However, the key to getting there will be concentrating on the preliminary steps. So broken is the negotiating mechanism that the best way to repair it is to do the nuts and the bolts first.
Instead of arguing about borders and land on the West Bank, the United States and Israel (as well as European and responsible Arab governments) need to do everything they can to make the wrenching elections through which the Palestinian people will choose Arafat's successor easier.
Instead of arguing about the status of East Jerusalem, the United States and Israel need to involve Palestinians directly in making the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as smooth, incident-free, and confidence-building as possible.
And instead of arguing about what makes serious negotiations about a final settlement possible, the United States and Israel need to ensure the largest possible turnout of voters in January on the accurate assumption that the more Palestinians vote the more the result will legitimize the elected leadership.
None of this is easy, for in concentrating on the interim, everyone involved will be testing attitudes about the ultimate issues. Each issue that arises will be testing a dangerous, chicken-and-egg proposition -- should major steps forward await the formation of a responsible Palestinian government that is willing to confront terrorists in its midst; or should risks be taken to help bring such a government into existence?
For example, up to now, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's withdrawal plans in Gaza have been entirely unilateral. In the execution of them, Palestinian cooperation would be helpful, but in urging it Bush will have to overcome the Israeli reluctance -- based on horrible experience -- to trust anyone but their own officials and to avoid appearing to confer legitimacy on untested Palestinians.
Similarly, it may be true that the more Palestinians vote the better their elected leadership's chances of establishing a rule of law. However, permitting freedom of movement on the West Bank that would promote participation (including some pulling back of Israeli military units) would also involve security considerations.
And permitting Palestinians in Jerusalem to vote in the election in two months might suggest a thing or two about the city's ultimate status in some Israelis' minds, but determined US guidance could establish the point that the election would only be about the election. For the additional voters, it would be worth it.
From last week's performance here, including the period during which Blair was visiting, it is unclear how serious Bush is about changing course. The atmospherics were excellent, but the president's words still overemphasized the burden on the Palestinians.
To move forward quickly and effectively, the most obvious need was for Secretary of State Colin Powell to stick around. His impending departure is a setback because the administration's bench strength in major league diplomacy is weak.
It was easy to cut Arafat off more than three years ago. The mistake Bush made was in not having a policy to maintain the intense US involvement that is always necessary for progress. It was a mistake Bush compounded in 2003 by not recognizing the opportunity Mahmoud Abbas's designation as prime minister represented (an opportunity squandered by the Israelis as well) for the three months that his government tried to function.
The president also goofed by casting his lot with the silly dream of his neoconservative pals (Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz above all) that the road to Middle East settlement starts in Baghdad. The fact is that invading Iraq has set back the US position in the Middle East and that post-9/11 this festering mess is as major a stimulant to terrorism as there is.
Bush now gets a third chance to get this right. He is not likely to get a fourth.
© Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company