AMALLAH, West Bank -- With tensions continuing to escalate in the Middle East over the killing this week of Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the founder of Hamas, the stakes have become even higher for Israel to succeed in its plan to withdraw militarily from the occupied territories. After all, the willingness of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel to take short-term risks for the sake of strategic long-term benefits for his country need not hurt the Palestinians.

Israel's exit from Gaza and parts of the West Bank holds the potential to reduce violence and bring about better Palestinian-Israeli relations. If unwisely pursued, however, Mr. Sharon's plan could instead pose serious threats to Palestinian national interests.

If the withdrawal — whether by Israeli design or as an unintended consequence — led to the emergence of a Palestinian faction or entity in the Gaza Strip separate from the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian people would lose the unified voice they need on the world stage. Such a schism is possible given the weakened state of the Palestinian Authority. Harmed by Israeli retaliatory measures during the last three years and plagued by corruption, inefficiency and internal divisions, the authority has been speedily losing legitimacy at home and abroad. As we are already seeing, this has led to the rise of nationalist warlords and Islamist organizations, like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, seeking to fill the vacuum left behind.

If the Israeli military also limits its withdrawal to Gaza and excludes the West Bank, as Mr. Sharon has indicated it might, that could further threaten the territorial integrity of the two geographically disconnected areas. This would only heighten divisions among Palestinians and encourage a greater role by the militant groups.

What can be done to prevent this? It is essential that the Bush administration propose ways to ease the potential negative consequences of the Israeli move. One of the most effective would be to hold Palestinian elections before the Israeli withdrawal, perhaps as early as September. The American-backed Middle East peace plan known as the road map already calls for such parliamentary elections. Linking the withdrawal to the road map — and the international support that comes with it — would only strengthen Israel's hand and serve the larger purpose of the peace process.

More important, holding elections would renew the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority, providing it with the political will to project leadership at a time when its existence is at stake. With legitimacy comes the ability to lead and take risks. The authority's crackdown on Islamist militants in March 1996, for example, would not have happened had the authority's leadership not gained legitimacy two months earlier in the first Palestinian elections.

In addition, elections would provide Hamas and the nationalist warlords with the opportunity to translate their popularity into parliamentary seats. The integration of these forces into the political system would make it possible for the new government to enforce existing laws against vigilante violence and to collect illegal arms. Finally, elections could provide Palestinians with the means to find their way back to democracy and good governance. No single person, no matter how authoritarian, would again be able to concentrate so much power in his hands.

The elections could be based on the constitutional amendments ratified by the Palestinian Legislative Council in March 2003, which are intended to shift power from the office of the president to those of the cabinet and prime minister. The new elections would most likely strip the old guard of much of its power and give rise to young guard nationalists — a condition for rehabilitating the Palestinian Authority and weakening Islamist opposition.

Polls conducted since the 1996 elections, show that the new parliament would be shared by three forces: the mainstream Fatah nationalists are projected to win up to 40 percent of the seats (compared to the 75 percent they now hold); independent nationalists and moderate Islamists a quarter of the seats; and members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad the rest.

The nationalist mainstream would still be able to form the government and appoint the prime minister from among its ranks. Although Yasir Arafat would most likely seek and win a new term as president of the Palestinian Authority, his re-election would take place within the context of a constrained office. The new prime minister would have to worry more about his coalition partners than about the whims of the president. The Palestinian political system would finally acquire that elusive accountability it has dearly missed during the last decade of Mr. Arafat's authoritarianism.

In order for the elections to be honest and safe, Palestinians would need to reach an internal understanding on a cease-fire during the months of campaigning and continuing until at least a month after elections to allow the new Legislative Council to meet and grant confidence in the new leadership. Also necessary is an equal commitment to holding fair elections open to all groups, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Strong regional and international support and, if necessary, pressure, would be crucial to ensuring that elections be conducted without violence.

Israel must also play a role. Elections would require Israelis to respect the Palestinian cease-fire by observing one of their own and by halting their incursions into Palestinian areas. During the election period they would also, among other things, need to declare a moratorium on the construction of their separation wall and end their occupation of Palestinian cities. If Israel is sincere in encouraging Palestinian democracy and seeking a credible peace partner, it should welcome elections as a way to get both.

Palestinian elections present the Bush administration with the best opportunity to give a concrete expression of its declared commitment to pursuing both regional democracy and Palestinian-Israeli peace. Therefore, the administration needs to take the lead in helping to set a date for Palestinian elections. For the Palestinian people themselves, elections would not only give them a more accountable political system, but also help them maintain their unity at a time when the stakes are higher and the opportunities to regain control of their land have never been greater.

Khalil Shikaki is the director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research.