A Palestinian
Pact
It could end factional fighting in Gaza,
but don't expect much progress with Israel.
Saturday, February 10, 2007
THE IMMEDIATE aim of the accord between Palestinian factions reached in Mecca on Thursday is to end internecine fighting that has killed more than 90 people in the past two months. If it achieves that end, the deal between Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the Islamic Hamas movement will at least prevent the eruption of another civil war in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, which hosted the talks, can also hope that its diplomacy -- and the reported promise of $1 billion in aid to the new government -- will begin to draw the Sunni Hamas movement away from its alliance with Shiite Iran. All that would be decidedly to the good.
Whether the deal serves to advance an
Israeli-Palestinian peace process is another and considerably more uncertain question. Because his main aim was to stop bloodshed among the Palestinians, Mr. Abbas didn't insist that Hamas meet the three conditions set by Israel, the United States and other outside powers for a resumption of aid. Hamas still hasn't recognized Israel or sworn off violence, and the "respect" for "international resolutions" and previous Palestinian-Israeli agreements included in the pact falls short of a commitment to compliance. Consequently, a cloud has fallen over the three-way meeting of Mr. Abbas, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice planned for Feb. 19.
Hamas nevertheless shifted its position, if only slightly. Khaled Meshal, the Damascus-based hardliner who torpedoed a Palestinian deal last June by ordering the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier, agreed for the first time to a "unity" government not controlled by Hamas. While the movement's current prime minister will remain in office, Hamas will not have a cabinet majority and the foreign and finance ministers will be independent moderates. What remains to be seen is whether the coalition government successfully forms and takes steps that would be welcomed by Israel, such as releasing the captive soldier and enforcing a cease-fire in Gaza that has been regularly breached by the firing of Palestinian rockets.
For now, the accord has confounded an already confused U.S. policy in the Middle East. Having recently divided the region into "moderates" and "extremists," the Bush administration was attempting to strengthen the "moderate" Mr. Abbas against the "extremist" Hamas. Now another of the "moderates," Saudi Arabia, has stepped into the diplomatic vacuum created by American policy and brokered a deal across a divide that only the Bush administration and Israel perceived; as the Saudis see it, the dividing line in the region is sectarian, not ideological. Unable to embrace the Palestinian accord but reluctant to offend a Saudi ally it has been counting on for help against Iran, the Bush administration adopted an awkward wait-and-see position. As events unfold in the coming days, it will watch from the sidelines, to which it has been relegated by its own ineptitude.