A chance for peace: Give Middle East's moderates a chance

The Economist
Published on: 03/25/07

Palestinians have been on the brink of civil war ever since Hamas swept the old Fatah elite from power last year. With a unity government sworn in on March 17, they may have made peace among themselves. But does this welcome development bring them any closer to making peace with Israel?

The new Cabinet is led by the same prime minister from Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, whose first government was ostracized by Israel and the world because it rejected three demands: renounce violence, recognize Israel and honor previous Palestinian agreements.

This time members of Fatah, small centrist parties and independents have been given key ministries. But of the three tests, the government has agreed, in a roundabout way, only to "respect" earlier accords. Indeed, Haniyeh declared that Palestinians were entitled to wage "resistance in all its forms" against Israel.

Does the creation of this government mark a moderate step by Hamas or a surrender by Fatah? Many Palestinians say Hamas is being more pragmatic: though it will not accept the three demands now, it might do so in the context of a credible peace.

Israel disagrees, accusing Fatah of signing up to an extremist agenda. Israel is therefore refusing to recognize the new government or release its funds. And it has downgraded contacts with Fatah's Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president.

Though Israel's exasperation is understandable, it would be wiser to take a half-step in response to what some see as a half- step by Hamas. It could for example give back some money for humanitarian needs and maintain contact with the moderates it has always talked to. America and Europe are already moving this way, and Israel risks isolating itself.

The Arab states have a role to play as well. At a summit in Riyadh this week their leaders intend to relaunch the peace initiative they signed in Beirut in 2002. This offered Israel peace and normal relations in return for a full withdrawal from the territories it occupied in 1967.

But the initiative was stillborn, not least because it coincided with the first Palestinian intifada and one especially terrible atrocity in which a Hamas suicide bomber blew himself up in a hotel, killing 30 Israelis at Passover. Arab leaders did not utter a word of condemnation. The response of Ariel Sharon, then prime minister, was to send his army back into the cities of the West Bank, from which it had withdrawn under the Oslo peace accords.

The Arabs are right to try again. But this time they need to go beyond the simple declaration of a take-it-or-leave-it final deal. They should draw up their own "road map" to peace.

An international road map has of course existed for four years. This envisaged three steps. First would come an end to terrorism and a freeze on Jewish settlement in the occupied territories. The Palestinians would then get a provisional state with temporary borders. Only later would there be negotiation on a permanent peace.

This map's defect was that it detailed the first steps but was vague about the destination. Without knowing that, neither side was eager to start the journey. The Beirut initiative suffers from the opposite weakness. It specifies a destination that no Israeli government could accept, since it entails Israel giving up every inch of land occupied in 1967 and implies letting all refugees displaced by the creation of the Jewish state return to what is now Israel.

In fact, as serious peacemakers on both sides know, any mutually acceptable peace would have to resemble former U.S. President Bill Clinton's "parameters" of 2000: Israel's withdrawal from most but not all of the West Bank, land swaps to make up for any chunks it keeps, a deal to share Jerusalem and the return of most refugees to a Palestinian state rather than Israel proper.

A good way to restart diplomacy would be for America and the Arab states to confirm that this is roughly how they see a final agreement. They might thus reassure Palestinians that they will get a fair deal, and assuage Israeli fears of being confronted with excessive demands.

At the very least, the Arabs should indicate that their Beirut initiative was a starting point, not a final demand. An Arab road map might then offer Israel step-by-step rewards —- such as greater diplomatic acceptance and economic cooperation —- in return for each Israeli move.

Though such actions will not resolve anything at a stroke, they would over time strengthen moderates in both camps. The Arabs have more influence on Israeli opinion than they imagine, if they dared to use it.