Untitled Document

Resurrection in Ramallah

October 4, 2002

Just three weeks ago, President Yasser Arafat's political career seemed headed directly--and deservedly--for the trash heap of history. The Palestinian Legislative Council, traditionally a spineless bunch, complained about his corrupt leadership and threatened a no-confidence vote. There was even talk of easing Arafat out by naming an "executive prime minister." He quickly accepted the Cabinet's resignation and scheduled elections for January.

Yet on Sunday, after a 10-day Israeli siege that nearly leveled his headquarters in Ramallah, Arafat emerged triumphant, flashing a victory sign, cheered on by euphoric supporters. For this astounding turn of political fortunes, Arafat can thank Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

By ordering the siege, Sharon once again cast Arafat in the role of victim--a sure-shot way to rekindle Palestinian support. An Israeli plan revealed Thursday to nab Arafat and drop him off in the Libyan desert, if carried out, would only elevate this washed-up character to the pantheon of Palestinian martyrs.

Arafat also ought to thank the Bush administration, which initially voiced only muted displeasure with the siege, until someone realized it might jeopardize the delicate process of coalition-building, particularly with Arab countries, preceding a possible attack on Iraq.

Repeated calls from Washington over the weekend persuaded Sharon to call off his siege. The U.S. now should let Israel know, unambiguously, that exiling Arafat would only set back what's left of the Mideast peace process.

Decades of corrupt and inept rule, plus two years of pounding by the Israeli army, had finally caught up with Arafat. Retirement, forced by the Palestinians themselves, would have met one of the top items on the U.S. and Israeli wish lists.

Instead he is back on the saddle. Plans to install a prime minister have been shelved and Arafat's popularity is back up.

Sharon justified the siege as a reaction to two recent suicide bombings. Except that the Islamic Jihad and Hamas factions, which claimed responsibility for the attack, are not under Arafat's control. And with the Palestinian police all but wiped out as a result of the Israeli army's reoccupation of much of the West Bank, Arafat is not in control of much of anything.

Indeed, some Israeli government sources admitted the ultimate goal of Sharon's operation was to push Arafat out of the country altogether.

Israel is right to defend itself and to demand that Arafat finally get out of the way. But tactics like these sabotage both goals.

On Sept. 24, the UN Security Council, with the U.S. abstaining, demanded an end to the attack. Israeli bulldozers continued with the demolition. It wasn't until then that the Bush administration began to recognize that Israel's move was undercutting delicate U.S. negotiations with Arab countries over Iraq. The assault on Arafat's headquarters has been criticized in Israel and abroad as a bone-headed move, perhaps Sharon's biggest blunder. The U.S. deserves blame for not acting sooner to pressure Sharon, whose attitude toward other American policy concerns in the Middle East borders on contempt.

For all the domestic and international criticism of Sharon, the most telling sign of his failure is an opinion poll following the attack on Arafat's headquarters. It shows Palestinian support for Arafat `s re-election had jumped to 60 percent from 48 percent. Perhaps he'll name Sharon as his campaign manager.