ASHINGTON
— In his recent speech on the Mideast, President Bush made any improvement
in Palestinians' miserable life conditional not only on security
for Israel but on the removal of Yasir Arafat, their elected president,
and on the implementation of political reforms. Since most Palestinians
have no confidence in the Bush administration, they took the president's
remarks as a green light to Israel to remove Mr. Arafat and perhaps
renew occupation. Israel's declaration of "victory" after the speech
indicated that Israelis interpreted it similarly.
If you were
a Palestinian, you would probably feel that you have nothing more
to lose. If you were Mr. Arafat, you would certainly have no incentive
to step down. After all, he would be doing nothing more than leaving
his people with a despicably corrupt and rightly friendless Palestinian
Authority, keeping for himself only a political farewell colored
by shameful defeat. He might also be leaving his people to the mercies
of a politically strengthened fundamentalism.
These do not
have to be our alternatives. Mr. Arafat does need to give up some
power, and a great many Palestinians want him to. But neither he
nor they will yield to curt demands from Washington or anywhere
else. Surely that has been made clear in the past few years.
The framework
for transformation already exists. The Palestinian Authority was
always meant to be a temporary framework pending the creation of
a full state structure and agreement with Israel on permanent status.
The reforms publicized last month — centralizing finances and security,
calling for municipal as well as national elections — were the result
of long and careful work by Palestinians hoping to put their state
on a firm foundation.
The question
of what kind of democratic governance will prevail in the future
state of Palestine has been a matter of heated political debate.
A draft constitution, finished two years ago, called for a presidential
system. But many Palestinian scholars believe the only way to overcome
the authoritarian legacy of the Palestine Liberation Organization
is through a parliamentary system with a strong prime minister.
A parliamentary
system would have two great advantages for Palestine: it would provide
a peaceful forum for many different parties and factions to struggle
over power, and it would severely restrict the ability of any one
person to dominate the political scene for very long. The parties
and factions that characterize Palestinian politics today — Hamas,
Fatah, Islamic Jihad, Palestinian People's Party, Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine and others — would need to form
coalitions to contest power, and this would lead to a general moderation.
It is unlikely that any party could so dominate the scene that it
could name the prime minister without extensive consultation with
allies.
The Palestinian
Legislative Council is currently debating three amendments to the
existing Basic Law, all introduced by Mr. Arafat and all minor changes.
It should debate and adopt a fourth amendment as well, to transform
the system from presidential to parliamentary. In such a system,
the parliament could elect the president and, in the course of drafting
the constitution, could limit his powers. The essential executive
power would rest with the prime minister. Obviously, adopting this
parliamentary system would eliminate the need for presidential elections,
now scheduled for January 2003.
I believe Mr.
Arafat would not contest parliamentary elections with the hope of
being named prime minister. I expect he would wait to be elected
president, perhaps president for life in recognition of his crucial
contribution to Palestinian independence. But even if he did campaign
for the premiership and win, he would at last be in a system that
would force him to share power and recognize the legitimacy of domestic
opposition.
Many Palestinians
support the adoption of a prime-ministerial system. Forty-eight
percent approved such a change in a poll I conducted this May. Forty-four
percent opposed it. I believe support is in fact much stronger,
but was tamped down because respondents did not want to be seen
as advocating Mr. Arafat's withdrawal from prominence — that is,
they hesitated at endorsing the wishes of Israel and the United
States.
This spring,
during the surge in debate over political reform that followed Israel's
incursions into the West Bank, the Revolutionary Council of Fatah,
Mr. Arafat's party, and the Palestinian Legislative Council both
urged that Mr. Arafat appoint a prime minister, as he could do under
the Basic Law. Palestinians understand parliamentary systems, with
their multiple parties and coalition governments; this is the system
Israel has, and Palestinians, of course, have observed it closely.
In polls, Palestinians give Israel's democracy the highest positive
rating, ahead of any other system.
Placing power
in the hands of a parliament, rather than a president, would speed
the transformation of militias and political factions like Hamas
into parties that compete for votes. It would also put an end to
the P.L.O.'s legacy of one-man rule. Palestinians could at last
escape the trap of supporting a bad government out of fear that
any replacement would be worse. Importantly, young nationalists,
angry with the corruption and mismanagement of the old guard, would
find in the new system a place for themselves.
The reasons
for public support for a parliamentary system are obvious. Over
time many Palestinians have lost confidence in Mr. Arafat, with
his approval rating plummeting from a high of 75 percent in January
1996 to 35 percent this May. He has failed to deliver good governance
or an end to occupation. During the current confrontations with
Israel, most believed that he failed in projecting leadership. Now
young men protest his rule in the streets of Gaza.
Yet most Palestinians
also fear that American demands for new leadership are meant to
clear the way toward a long-term interim agreement with a Palestinian
ministate — the exceedingly vague "provisional" state alluded to
by Mr. Bush — that will amount to an Israeli protectorate in a small
part of the occupied territories. In the fight to avert being left
with such a defenseless and dependent statelet, Palestinians believe
strongly that they still need Mr. Arafat. He is their elected leader
and the symbol of their national aspirations, and without him they
would fear both Israeli and international neglect, as well as political
strife at home.
The United
States can help address these fears by maintaining its support for
Palestinian statehood and political reform and insisting that all
parties work toward a sensible permanent-status agreement. Without
such assurances, elections — particularly if they are under the
current presidential system — may result in strengthening Islamists
and radical nationalists. But if Mr. Arafat, with American support,
were to lead Palestinians up to parliamentary elections, the outcome
could be different.
Khalil Shikaki
is director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research
in Ramallah and currently a visiting fellow at The Brookings Institution's
Saban Center in Washington D.C.