A Dangerous Lull

Sunday, July 14, 2002; Page B06

ON MONDAY, three weeks will have passed since President Bush presented his latest ideas for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the surface, little has happened since then, either on the ground or in diplomacy. That is good news, in part: With Israeli troops occupying most Palestinian towns and enforcing tight restrictions on movement, there have been no suicide bombings or other major incidents of violence in Israel or the Palestinian territories. But it is also worrisome. Behind the scenes, American, European, Russian and U.N. officials have quietly been seeking to flesh out plans for overhauling the Palestinian Authority, the starting point spelled out by Mr. Bush for launching a new peace process. But the work has been slow; only on Tuesday are the discussions due to reach the level of Secretary of State Colin Powell. The bottom line is that the practical road map for taking action that was so conspicuously missing from Mr. Bush's speech has yet to appear.

That there is so little movement is highly dangerous, because it risks the breakdown of the nascent homegrown Palestinian reform movement and a new explosion of violence. It also offers ammunition to those, including many in the Arab world, who saw in the president's speech not a serious commitment to brokering Middle East peace but a thin and one-sided artifice that abruptly stopped at the points that would have required tough or politically difficult calls. In particular, the administration's spokespeople still have not made clear how they intend to promote the democratic selection of a new Palestinian leadership while simultaneously ensuring that Yasser Arafat -- the probable winner of any straightforward presidential election -- is not a part of it. Nor is it clear how Palestinians who favor compromise and an end to violence can emerge through such an electoral process if no signs of compromise or moderation are forthcoming from Israel.

Others are throwing out some potentially useful ideas. A variety of voices, ranging from German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer to Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki, are suggesting that the Arafat problem be finessed through the appointment or eventual election of a Palestinian prime minister, who would exercise power while Mr. Arafat remained as a figurehead. Some suggest that an international consortium, led by the United States, be created to oversee a detailed program for constructing a new and accountable Palestinian authority. And almost everywhere outside the Bush administration, the point is made that Israel must advance the process with good faith measures of its own. A plan for ending the military reoccupation of West Bank towns is essential if Palestinians are to resume self-rule. Even more important are measures that demonstrate an Israeli acceptance of Mr. Bush's goal of creating a Palestinian state alongside Israel -- starting with a freeze on Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon rejects a settlement freeze and most other confidence-building measures; he has resisted the administration's modest request that he release hundreds of millions of dollars in Palestinian tax revenue confiscated by Israel. His ministers are devoting themselves to destroying potential alternatives to Mr. Arafat; one went out of his way this week to shut down the office of Sari Nusseibeh, who has led the Palestinian reaction against suicide bombing. Mr. Sharon's intransigence stems from the simple fact that he and most of his government strongly oppose the U.S. goal of creating a viable Palestinian state in the next several years; they no more favor Mr. Bush's long-term ideas than does Mr. Arafat. Mr. Bush has been harsh with the prostrate and friendless Palestinian, who certainly deserves no better; but he has also been meticulous in ignoring the other side of the problem. To acknowledge differences with Mr. Sharon, of course, would not be easy; it might incur tension with conservative Republicans or Congress. Mr. Bush so far seems willing to push only those parts of a Middle East initiative that avoid such costs. That may help to explain why so little has happened since his speech.