A Larger Canvas . . .
Two former national security advisers discuss the Middle East.

By Samuel R. Berger
Friday, May 17, 2002; Page A29

Four realities emerge from the most recent Middle East confrontations:

First, a Palestinian strategy of terror will not work. Israelis will not permit it, nor can we. Israelis are not driven to the sea by suicide bombs; they are driven to the right. Terror ultimately is a strategy of suicide for the Palestinians.

Second, as most Israelis understand, military action by itself cannot bring lasting security. The physical infrastructure of terror can be severely, and if necessary repeatedly, damaged. The psychological infrastructure of terror -- the bitterness and anger -- smolders in the wake of the tanks.

Third, belief in mutual accommodation has crumbled -- yet the impulse on each side for unilateral solutions is rooted more in resignation than in confidence. Seventy-five percent of Israelis support military operations in Palestinian cities although they believe these efforts will result in increased terror attacks against Israel; roughly two-thirds of Palestinians support suicide attacks, even though more than 90 percent believe they are worse off than when the intifada started.

Fourth, as every American president since Nixon has understood, U.S. leadership, indeed presidential leadership, is essential.

So what should we do in this window of time between the ramp down, for now, of the Israeli military operation and the regrouping of the terrorists? Is there any way through the political and emotional minefield that can lead toward a secure Jewish state alongside a peaceful and democratic Palestinian, one that respects Israel's existence? Some suggest we now are in a "waiting game." But there is no stable status quo.

We must first deal with the stark paradoxes in the current situation. Israelis can no longer trust Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat to carry out any political deal or provide security for Israel. Yet only Arafat will have a mandate from the Palestinians to negotiate. A political process cannot be conducted in an environment of officially sanctioned Palestinian violence. Yet there is no chance of any sustained effort to stop the violence without an expectation of a different political future for Palestinians.

There are some strands to work with. The Saudis and Egyptians may be scared enough of the threat of escalating conflict to their own regimes that they are prepared to do some heavy lifting. Palestinians no less than Israelis are fed up with the corruption and authoritarianism associated with Arafat, although they expect that they, not Israel or the international community, will determine their future leadership. Israelis will do what it takes to protect themselves, but as Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has said, there must be a political end game.

The global community cannot dictate a durable peace. But it can try to create new opportunities. What are the elements of a larger canvas?

• Democratic change for the Palestinians. Arafat offers no realistic hope for change, for Palestinians or for Israel. But he may be the necessary bridge from the past to the future. There must be active support from the United States and others for advancing civil reform and honest and open political and administrative Palestinian institutions, including a timetable for internationally supervised elections that would correspond with a time frame for a negotiated agreement between the parties. Any agreement would have to be ratified by the Palestinian people to be implemented by a new Palestinian leadership selected simultaneously. Arafat would have to agree, as part of an overall package, to assume, at most, a ceremonial role. Israelis would be making peace with the Palestinian people -- with foundations of a civil state in place.

• Immediate change in the status quo. There have been too many broken promises to get traction based on faith. The Arabs will need to take concrete steps toward Israel upfront. Economic and regional cooperation can begin before political relations are established. The international community, led by the United States, needs to engage immediately with the Palestinians to build a security apparatus ready and able to fight terror, not aid and abet it. Perhaps an acceptable international security presence will be needed in the interim. In the context of reciprocal steps, not promises, the Palestinians will need something from Israel upfront (e.g., dismantling of Gaza settlements, supported today by 65 percent of Israelis).

• A shared international framework for negotiations. A legitimate peace can come only from choice, not coercion. But the international community, led by the United States (and including the Saudis, Egyptians, Jordanians, Europeans and others) can provide a frame of reference for negotiations, to be achieved in phases or over an agreed timetable. The ultimate contours can be derived from negotiations that have gone on before, at Camp David and since, reflecting realities on both sides, stimulating debate and seeking to avoid endless wheel spinning, e.g., 1967 borders with adjustments and offsets; right of return to the State of Palestine, not Israel, with compensation for other refugees as part of ambitious international economic development; security guarantees for Israel; and a solution to the most vexing issue of Jerusalem's holy basin that respects the religious traditions of all parties.

This is not an easy path. But if pessimism is justified, fatalism is not. Who could have imagined years ago majority rule in South Africa without a bloodbath? Protestants and Catholics turning from violence to peace in Northern Ireland? Milosevic in The Hague and democracy in Belgrade? Intractable problems sometimes break loose with leadership and persistence. As President Bush has said, when Palestinian teens willingly kill themselves to murder Israeli teens, the future itself is dying. We must make no illusions about goodwill. Based on strength, firmness and vision, we must lead an effort to build a different, more peaceful future. The alternative is a far deeper crisis that will directly affect our vital interests.

The writer was President Clinton's national security adviser. He now heads Stonebridge International, a consulting firm.