Israel's best interest

9/24/2002

IT MAY BE understandable that Israel's leaders, as they prepare for a possible US-led military action against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, wish to retain two prerogatives they regard as indispensable to Israel's security: the deterrent power to punish militarily any attacker and the right of a sovereign country to conduct its own defense.

Nevertheless, if Saddam repeated his 1991 tactic of firing innacurate Scud-type missiles at Israel in an effort to provoke Israeli retaliation - and thereby incite Arab masses to demand that their regimes side with him - Israeli restraint would not only advance the United States effort but would also best serve Israel's long-term interests.

Tellingly, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made this point last Thursday during testimony to the House Armed Services Committee. Acknowledging that Israel may have ''a degree of vulnerability'' in the event of another US conflict with Saddam, Rumsfeld went on to say, ''there's also no doubt in my mind but that it would be in Israel's overwhelming best interests not to get involved.''

Rumsfeld is hardly an unworldly dove, he is not unfriendly to Israel, and he is not oblivious to the military value of a demonstration by Israeli leaders that they have both the capability and the will to deter all potential aggressors. So when Rumsfeld recommends that Israel hold its fire in the event of an attack by Saddam, his advice merits serious consideration from Israel's leadership.

Implicit in Rumsfeld's statement was his anticipation that Saddam's ''Republic of Fear'' will be swept away in a second war with the United States. And if a democratic, pro-Western government respecting human rights and the rule of law were to supplant Saddam's reign, the strategic configuration of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East would be transformed utterly. What strategists call the ''threat environment'' surrounding Israel would become much less dangerous. The specter of Saddam's battalions or missiles looming to the east of Israel would be effaced. The tactical allies Syria and Iran, if separated by a democratic Iraq, would find it far more difficult to harrass Israel through their Hezbollah proxies in southern Lebanon.

The reality is that Israel could gain much more in the way of security from a regime change in Baghdad than it did from the 1991 war to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait. If Israel refrained from retaliation then, it would have even more reason to do so now.

If this time Israel fell for some desperate provocation launched by Saddam and retaliated militarily, it could hardly improve upon what American forces would be doing. Far from demonstrating Israeli resolve and deterrence, any such retaliation would only jeopardize the chances of improving the strategic situation in Israel's neighborhood.

© Copyright 2002 Globe Newspaper Company.